Introduction
In this paper I argue against taking narrative as central to the 'shape of a life' phenomenon in value theory, partly by interpreting one exemplary life-narrative, Siegfried Sassoon's Memoirs of George Sherston. My aims are: first, to understand the evaluation of temporally-extended human lives as going well or badly. Second, to disambiguate one out of the various putative roles of autobiographical narrative in a cluster of problems about value, the self, and the interpretation of human lives over time. Third, by showing that narrative does not play that particular role, to advance by one step a general project of critique of the use of autobiographical narrative in that cluster of problems. I begin by introducing my central case.
Sassoon
Siegfried Sassoon was born in 1886 into materially comfortable but socially uneasy circumstances: his mother Theresa was from the artistic, socialist, but impeccably establishment Thornycroft family; his father Alfred was a younger son of the Jewish banking and trading dynasty founded in the early nineteenth century, in Baghdad, by 1 Kendall (2013) is one of many anthologies of the poetry. The autobiographies, apart from Sassoon's, include Blunden (2000) and Graves (2000) . 2 Anyone who knows Blackadder Goes Forth knows this default. See further Fussell (2000) , Winter (1995) , and, for argument that this picture of the war is largely wrong, Sheffield (2001) .
Please cite the official version forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
3 'He's a cheery old card,' grunted Harry to Jack
As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack. * But he did for them both by his plan of attack. (Sassoon 1984: 69) And through that experience to a transformed adult selfhood which looks back on pre-war innocence as another life, lived by someone else. As David Velleman puts the question about the shape of a life, 'is the good life just a string of good years?' (Velleman 2000: 57) . To see why we might think not, here is my version of a popular thought experiment. Consider two lives: Siegfried Sassoon's life of innocence transformed into experience; and his counterpart Sassoon Siegfried's life, 3 This value is variously labelled well-being (Griffin 1986) , welfare (Darwall 2002 ), prudential value (Tiberius 2015 , quality of life (Nussbaum & Sen 1993) , what makes someone's life go best (Parfit 1986) , what is good for a human being (Kraut 2007) , or the good life (Carson 2000) . I will use 'good', 'goodness', and 'good life', and talk of a life's 'going well', 'going best', and 'going better' (for the person whose life it is), from now on.
The Shape of a Life
Please cite the official version forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 which is a disordered 'sprawl of incidents' (Lessing 1995: 202) , one damn thing after another, with no overall shape or organizing telos. Assume that these two lives instantiate the exact same set of momentary goods and bads: that the only difference between them is the temporal ordering of those moments (compare Brännmark 2001: 226; Dorsey 2015: 304-5; O'Neill 2008 : 136 4 , Slote 1983 : 23-4, Velleman 2000 . This is an intuition pump for the thought that we should evaluate these lives differently as wholes, just because of their 'shape' over time. We might judge that Siegfried Sassoon's life goes better overall than Sassoon Siegfried's, but nothing I say here depends on that particular evaluation. The claim I need is only that lives can be other than equally good even though they contain all and only the same moments. I have no brief here to rank-order particular real or imaginary lives: my concern is the metalevel problem of explaining the relevance of temporal shape.
The conclusion we are supposed to draw from two lives is that overall goodness is not equal to the sum of momentary goods and bads. In evaluation of whole-life goodness, moments are not prior, either because the whole is prior and moments only have a value in that context 5 , or because they are distinct kinds of evaluation with no relation of priority either way 6 .
Call views that temporal shape matters for evaluation in this way compositional views, and the value-property they pick out composition (I take the term from Brännmark (Sacks 1986: 37) .
Despite these attractions, I think the narrative answer is a mistake. My plan against it is in three parts: first I define narrative, in order to make space, second, to display some possible non-narrative explanations of composition. Third, I argue against the narrative explanation and for an alternative explanation by self-realization.
So, first:
A narrative is a generic telling of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, agents.
7
These various features need not appear together; many of them are not individually necessary for something's being a narrative; and several sub-groups of them are sufficient for its being so. This is because narrative is a radial category (Lakoff 1987 analogy, contrast, and repetition within a rhythmic structure, and which contain images of human beings, alongside other objects, without representing their agency.
But there are limits to the extent of these chains: not everything is a narrative, because being a telling is a necessary condition of being one. There are no non-artefactual narratives. The existence of a narrative requires the narration of some content to which it refers, and which need not itself be a narrative. We can tell stories about stories- we can now see that this list combines two different kinds of connection, the explanatory 8 and the literary, and that they should be separated.
8 I don't mean to commit myself to the view that only causal connections could be explanatory. In particular, even if reasons are not just a variety of cause, agents' reasons may explain their actions-the President convened a meeting of her national security advisors in order to discuss a crisis in the Middle East. But I can remain neutral on this question: all I need is the claim that the literary relations of an actual action or event do not explain its occurrence (although they may explain the teller of a narrative's decision to represent those particular actions and events rather than others). rational to prefer goods occurring in the 'prime of life' over even much larger goods in childhood or old age (Slote 1983: chapter 1) . This is an appeal to the culturallymediated biological structure over time of a life, not to a narrative of that life. We can tell stories about that structure, and frequently do; but that's just an example of the point already made that many things are potential contents of narratives without themselves being narratives.
Fourth, self-realization, which is my view and which I set out in a separate section, next.
Self-realization
On my self-realization view, temporal shape makes a difference because some shapes are self-realizations and others are failed self-realizations: they map the expression of potential woken and fed by lucky circumstance, or its thwarting. The temporal structure of a human life which governs how well it goes as a whole is analogous to the temporal structure of the life of a tree which governs how well it goes as a whole.
For a tree: does it grow from acorn to sapling to spreading ancient oak? Does it wither for lack of water? Is it wired and pruned into a sad, twisted little bonsai? For a human being: does she flower into skilled, independent adulthood? Is she blighted by poverty How does his traumatic battlefield education transform him? Again, this possibility appeals to a narratable structure over time, but not to a narrative.
More abstractly, the self-realization account of the good life is that your life goes well for you when, and in the ways that, your particular true self flourishes rather than being undeveloped or crushed or distorted. Equivalently, when, and in the ways that, realization is distinct from perfectionism: perfectionism says that the good life is the one in which you realize essential human potential; self-realization says that it is the one in which you realize individual potential, at least some of which will also be common potential in the sense that other individuals' potentials are similar. That is, different human individuals will both share common human capacities and have their distinctive capacities which are less widely shared or not shared at all. Self-realization for one of us will therefore be in some ways like and in other ways unlike selfrealization for others, and the good life for me may be importantly different from the good life for you, or her, or him.
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I have offered the first three alternative views canvassed above mostly to make the point that a specifically narrative explanation of composition is only one possibility among several, and that there is therefore an argumentative gap between acceptance of the shape of a life claim and acceptance of a narrative explanation of it. I now move on to argue for self-realization and against narrative.
Agents, temporal sequences, and composition
Siegfried's Sassoon's innocence to experience life-shape does compositional work to the extent that we evaluate the goodness of his whole life differently from how we evaluate the goodness of Sassoon Siegfried's whole life. The question I am pursuing is: what explains that fact? In this and the following sections I argue for a self-realization answer to it by making use of my radial account of narrative. Once we pull the various conditions of narrativity apart and see how each might be involved in explaining composition, the attraction of a narrative explanation dissolves, and the attraction of a self-realization explanation becomes apparent, in different ways for different 10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for pointing out the need to make this distinction. 
Telling and composition
So is telling what's important here? Is it that Sassoon tells his life-story as innocence to experience that does the compositional work? This is a more promising thought.
Several accounts of the good life appeal to the subject's own judgements or attitudes about her life 11 . Narrative telling of a life involves a relation to that life; autobiographical narrative telling involves a specifically reflexive relation; and perhaps that relation constitutes the life's compositional good.
I don't think this appeal to telling works either, because it conflates two distinct roles which someone could take up with respect to a life: call them the storyteller and the judge. They are alike in being distanced, third-personal stances, even when reflexive.
The attention of the autobiographer to her own life involves separation of self from self, turning her attention as subject on her temporally-extended life as object, in the same way as she might turn her attention on a life which is not hers (Pascal 1960 , Goldie 2012 With those distinctions between meaning and good in place: telling does the storyteller's meaning-finding or meaning-making work, not the judge's goodevaluative work, including the specific evaluation of compositional good over the whole life. Narrative telling therefore fails to explain composition, although it perhaps does explain meaning. If that's right, the explanation of composition will have to appeal to some structure in the life, rather than one projected on to it or constructed in reaction to it. And the selfrealization explanation of composition does appeal to such a structure: the growth of the self over time. So, although this doesn't show that self-realization is the uniquely correct explanation of composition-there may well be other candidate explanations which meet this condition that the structure must be in the life-it does show that selfrealization is a better explanation of composition than narrative.
Genre and composition
Finally, does genre explain composition 12 ? Sassoon's autobiography belongs to a recognizable genre, the martial disillusionment narrative: it is a preeminent example of a standard twentieth-century way of writing about war experience as the burning away of illusion by battlefield education, also adopted by Ernst Jünger (2003), Paul Fussell (1996 ) 13 , Philip Caputo (1996 , and many others 14 . Perhaps it's that generic shape which does the compositional work and makes Siegfried Sassoon's life more than mere Humean froth.
12 This is again a MacIntyrean view, if not exactly MacIntyre's view. 13 Fussell's case is complicated by the fact that he was a brilliant interpreter of others'
war memoirs (Fussell 2000) before writing his own.
14 See Yuval Harari (2005 Harari ( , 2008 on the history of this way of making sense of war. Paul's argument is that the fact of transformative experience in human life is a problem for decision theory, because it makes rational expectation impossible. The person facing the decision whether to undergo such an experience-whether to have children, whether to become a soldier, whether to fight-cannot know in advance whether it will be good or bad for her, and therefore cannot make rational plans by trying to maximize the expected value (the probability of an outcome multiplied by its value) of her choices.
I take a different but compatible point from the fact of transformative experience. Battlefield education, as one of many kinds of transformative experience, is prior to the generic narration of that experience. And, I now add, transformative experience is one kind of self-realization: one way in which we grow is by transformation. As for telling in the previous section, the compositional work is done in the intrinsic structure of the life, not in something we relationally or reflexively do to it, or some stance we relationally or reflexively take up towards it. We may generically tell the stories of the transformative and other self-realizations which shape our lives, because they are more of the many potential contents for narratives. But we need not in order for that self-realization to happen. Self-realization is therefore, again, a better explanation of composition than is narrative genre.
Self-realization and composition
Summing up my argument: the narrative explanation for composition is that temporal shape matters because lives are (or can be) generic tellings of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, agents-in particular the agent whose life we are evaluating. The self-realization Telling cannot explain compositional value: the appearance that it might is based on a confusion between the storyteller's finding of unproblematically plural meaning in a life, and the judge's evaluation of its singular goodness for the person who lives it.
Goodness is not relational in the way that telling and meaning-finding require, but is in the structure of the life, and self-realization matches that feature where narrative cannot. Finally, genre cannot explain composition either, because the shape of a life can involve transformative experience, which is necessarily prior to its generic narration.
Self-realization again matches that feature where narrative cannot.
I want to emphasize a point about self-realization which this comparison brings out:
it is not relational, and therefore not, in particular, reflexive (it's not a relation a person has to herself because it's not a relation at all). Someone's degree of self-realization is a first-order feature of her life, the degree to which it in fact develops and expresses her central potentials. And, since self-realization explains composition, this is also the conclusion we should draw about that kind of value: the shape of a life which matters for the goodness of a life considered as a whole is a first-order fact about that life over Sassoon is right to understand his own life in this way). He could have stayed an innocent and an artistic failure, but the transformative experience of war enabled him to express at least part of his nature.
Where does this leave Sassoon's and others' autobiographical narratives? They do not constitute the compositional value of these lives: that's in the self-realizing structure of the life. But that may leave such narratives an important role in the discovery and understanding of composition: Sassoon's telling of his own story may reveal to his readers-and to Sassoon himself-an important way in which his life went well for him, despite its hardships and failures.
Conclusion
I have argued between the particular and the general. After setting out the shape of a life problem and some possible answers to it, I argued for a self-realization over a narrative explanation of composition in the case of Siegfried Sassoon and of other martial disillusionment narratives. I claim that this conclusion generalizes, and that self-realization, not narrative, explains all cases of composition.
Finally, by making that argument I have advanced, by one step, my most general aim:
a project of critique of the use of autobiographical narrative in a cluster of problems about value, the self, and our understanding of human life over time. For all I've said here, there is still plenty that autobiography might do to address that cluster. It might be an important means of self-discovery and self-understanding. It might be involved in identity-making self-interpretation, in self-constitution into moral and legal 
